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TEXT OF 8TATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109 (1953 as amended) provides:
41-1-109. Unlawful control over vehicles—
Penalties—Effect of prior consent—Accessory or
accomplice.
(1) Any person who exercises unauthorized
control over a vehicle, not his own, without the
consent of the owner or lawful custodian and with
intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful
custodian of possession of the vehicle, is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor.
(2) Any offense under this section is a
third degree felony if the actor does not return the
vehicle to the owner or lawful custodian within 24
hours after the exercise of unauthorized control.
(3) The consent of the owner or legal
custodian of a vehicle to its control by the actor
is not in any case presumed or implied because of
the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a
previous occasion to the control of the vehicle by
the same or a different person.
(4) Any person who assists in, or is a party
or accessory to or an accomplice in, an unauthorized
taking or driving is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1953 as amended) provides:
41-1-112. Receiving or transferring stolen vehicle
a felony.
Any person who, with intent to procure or
pass title to a vehicle which he knows or has reason
to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken,
receives, or transfers possession of the same from
or to another, or who has in his possession any
vehicle which he knows or has reason to believe has
been stolen or unlawfully taken, and who is not an
officer of the law engaged at the time in the
performance of his duty as such officer, is guilty
of a felony.

iv

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

RONALD W. BASFORD,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 890281-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a
first degree or capital felony.

In this case, the Honorable

Leonard H. Russon, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt lake County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and
conviction against Mr. Basford for "Possession of a Stolen Vehicle,"
a third degree felony.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the trial court err in convicting Mr. Basford of
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112?
(a)

Was there sufficient evidence to convict

Appellant of Possession of a Stolen Vehicle?
(b)

Did the trial court err in failing to set aside

the greater offense under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 and
convict Appellant of the lesser offense under Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-1-109?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1953 as amended).

The trial judge

found Mr. Basford guilty after a bench trial on stipulated facts
held on March 9, 1989, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, presiding.
The trial court sentenced Mr. Basford to a term of zero to
five years at the Utah State Prison; the court stayed the prison
sentence and placed Appellant on probation (R. 90).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 30, 1988, Officer Cutler of the Sandy City
Police Department arrested Ronald Basford.

Mr. Basford was

subsequently charged with Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1953 as amended), and
Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal or Command, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1953 as amended).
On February 16, 1989, Mr. Basford pled guilty to the charge
of Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal or Command and
submitted the charge of Possession of a Stolen Vehicle to the court
in a bench trial on stipulated facts (R. 29; Transcript of
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February 16, 1989 at 1, 9-10).
1.

Those stipulated facts are:

That on September 29, 1988, Mr. Ken McAffee

parked his 1983 Ford pickup truck on the street in Salt
Lake County.
2.

That on September 29, 1988, at approximately

9:00 p.m., some person took the truck and that no person
had permission to take the vehicle.
3.

That on September 30, 1988, at 1:00 a.m.,

Officer A. Tim Cutler of the Sandy Police Department
observed the Defendant, Ronald W. Basford, driving
Mr. McAffee's 1983 Ford pickup in Sandy, Utah.
4.

That Officer Cutler attempted to stop the

Defendant, Ronald W. Basford, but that the Defendant
attempted to flee.
5.

That Mr. Basford was eventually stopped and

arrested.
6.

That Mr. Basford would testify that on

September 30, 1988, he was in possession of Mr. McAffee's
car at a time when he knew that the car had been unlawfully
taken and, further, that it was intent to abandon the
vehicle that night near the area from which it had been
taken.
(R. 27-8).

See Addendum A.

As part of the submission, defense

counsel argued that Mr. Basford should be found guilty of Joy
Riding, a class A misdemeanor, and not the greater offense,
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, a third degree felony (R. 29).
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The trial judge found Mr. Basford guilty of "Possession of
a Stolen Vehicle," a third degree felony (R. 90; Transcript of
March 9, 1989, hereinafter "T", at 12).

After oral argument, the

judge read into the record a memorandum decision he had prepared
prior to oral argument, based on the memoranda previously prepared
by the parties (T. 9-13, R. 86-9).

See Addendum B for trial judge's

ruling.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There was insufficient evidence to establish that
Mr. Basford was guilty of the crime of Possession of a Stolen
Vehicle.

Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112, when read in conjunction with

case law, seems to require an intent to permanently deprive the
owner of a motor vehicle.

The stipulated facts in this case fail to

establish that Mr. Basford had such a permanent intent.
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court follows the literal
language of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 and requires only that a
defendant have knowledge or belief that a vehicle was unlawfully
taken in order to be guilty under that statute, the elements
required under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109 are identical to those
under § 41-1-112 under the circumstances of this case.

The trial

court therefore should have convicted Mr. Basford under Utah Code
Ann. § 41-1-109 because a lesser penalty is available under that
section.
Furthermore, where a defendant is precluded from returning
the vehicle because he is arrested within twenty-four hours of the
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vehicle being taken and such defendant intended to return the
vehicle to the vicinity from which it was taken, such defendant has
committed a class A misdemeanor rather than a third degree felony
under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109.

ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
APPELLANT OF POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1-112.
A. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT
MR. BASFORD OF POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE.
Due process requires that the state prove beyond a
reasonable doubt each and every element of the offense charged.
State v. Cox, 751 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1988), citing Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2327, 53 L.Ed.2d 287
(1977).

Where a defendant claims on appeal that there was

insufficient evidence to establish one or more elements of the crime
for which he was convicted, the standard of review differs depending
on whether the case was tried to the bench or to a jury.
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-3 (Utah 1987).

See

Where a case is

tried to the bench, this Court must set aside the findings or
verdict where they are against the clear weight of evidence, or if
this Court otherwise "reaches a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made . . . ."

Id. at 193.1

1

When an appellate court in this state reviews the
sufficiency of evidence in a case tried to a jury, the court will
overturn the verdict "only when the evidence is so lacking and
(continued)
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In the present case, the trial judge convicted Mr. Basford of
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1953
as amended) rather than joy riding as outlined in Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-1-109 (1953 as amended).

Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 provides:

Receiving or Transferring Stolen Vehicle a Felony.
Any person who with intent to procure or pass
title to a vehicle which he knows or has reason to
believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken,
receives or transfers possession of the same from
one to another, or who has in his possession any
vehicle which he knows or has reason to believe has
been stolen or unlawfully taken, and who is not an
officer of the law engaged at the time in the
performance of his duty as such officer, is guilty
of a felony.
As the title of the statute indicates, this statute focuses
on the transfer and receipt of stolen vehicles.

The first portion

of the statute, ending with the word "another," clearly requires an
intent to procure or pass title coupled with the receipt or transfer
of possession of the vehicle.

Whether the intent to procure or pass

title is also required for the second portion of the statute, the
portion applicable to the present case, is less clear.

However, the

title of the statute, the use of the word "stolen" and case law

(footnote 1 continued)
insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have reached that
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 192, quoting State v.
Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555, 557 (Utah 1985); State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d
539, 550 (Utah 1983); State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah
1983). In other words, the tremendous deference given a jury
verdict is not applicable where a case is tried to the bench.
Furthermore, because this case was tried on stipulated facts, the
trial court did not assess demeanor of witnesses or arguably believe
one witness over another. This court is presented with evidence
identical to that placed before the trial court and is in the unique
position of being able to review in toto the decision of the trial
court.
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registered it in his name.

Larocco, 742 P.2d at 92.

defendant transferred title to the stolen vehicle.
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at 637. Therefore, a permanent intent to deprive the owner of the
vehicle was present in these cases.2
In the present case, it is unclear whether the trial judge
required an intent to permanently deprive in reaching his decision
to convict Mr. Basford under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112. Prior to
the hearing, the trial judge had prepared a Memorandum Decision
which he read into the record after defense counsel failed to
convince him during oral argument that the decision was incorrect.
The judge's comments and the Memorandum Decision are contained in
Addendum B.
As part of the Memorandum Decision, the trial court stated:
The Court finds that the acts of the defendant fall
within section 41-1-112 Utah Code Annotated. That

2

The fourth case found in the annotations, State v.
Butterfield, 261 P. 804 (Utah 1927), was actually decided prior to
the enactment of the statute and dealt with the issue of whether the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice was sufficient to sustain
the conviction.
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Mr, Basford (R. 27). The facts also establish that Mr. Basford
intended to "abandon the vehicle that night near the area from which
it had been taken" (R. 28). Regardless of whether this intent to
leave the truck near the area from which it had been taken fits
within the confines of the requirement of Utah Code Ann,
§ 41-1-109(2) that the vehicle be returned to the owner for the
crime to qualify as a misdemeanor, it nevertheless establishes only
an intent to temporarily deprive as opposed to a permanent intent.
The short period of time that the vehicle was missing and
Mr. Basford7s intent to return it to the area from which it was
taken are in contrast to the facts of other cases where a defendant
has been convicted under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112. See Levin, 587
P.2d at 125, 126 (vehicle missing two days, tampered with so that it
could be started without a key, defendant in possession of tools to
enable him to start vehicle); Larocco, 742 P.2d at 90 (car stolen
several years before, parked at defendant's home for number of days
and registered to defendant); Tuggle, 501 P.2d at 637 (title
transferred by defendant to lending institution); Porter, 502 P.2d
at 1148 (purpose of statute to prevent stealing and trafficking of
stolen motor vehicles).
In addition to focusing on the defendant's failure to
return the vehicle directly to its owner within twenty-four hours,
the trial judge focused on Mr. Basford's flight when the officer
attempted to stop him as evidence that Mr. Basford was guilty of
this particular crime. Various courts, including the Utah Supreme
Court, have acknowledged that flight does not necessarily mean that
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Court.

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE
THE GREATER OFFENSE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1-112
AND CONVICT MR. BASFORD UNDER THE LESSER JOY RIDING
STATUTE.
When read literally, Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1953 as
amended) requires only that an individual in possession of a vehicle
know or have reason to believe that the vehicle was "unlawfully
taken" in order to be guilty of the crime charged under that statute.
At trial, defense counsel argued that the charges of
joy riding, as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109 (1953 as
amended), and Receiving a Stolen Vehicle, as outlined in Utah Code
Ann. § 41-1-112 (1953 as amended), contain identical elements in the
context of this case.

Defense counsel pointed out that, according

to the State, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 occurs where
a defendant is in possession of a vehicle he knew to have been
unlawfully taken, and that in any joy riding, including the instant
case, those elements are present (T. 7).
The State responded, arguing that since defendant only
intended to abandon the vehicle in the area from which it was taken
and not to return it directly to its owner, the appropriate charge
was Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (T. 7-8).3
Assuming, arguendo, that the statute requires only that the
defendant know or have reason to believe that the vehicle was
unlawfully taken (and not that he have an intent to permanently

3

The statute actually gives a defendant a greater penalty
where he fails to return the vehicle within twenty-four hours, but
does not make return to the owner an element of the crime of
joy riding. Intent to temporarily deprive an owner is the key to
the joy riding statute, not the return of the vehicle.
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In State v. Levin, the defendant argued that under Shondel
and its progeny, he should have been convicted under the joy riding
statute (Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109) rather than Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-1-112.

On its face, the argument in Levin is identical to the

argument in the instant case; however, the facts in Levin differ
significantly from those in the instant case, making the holding in
Levin that the defendant was not entitled to the joy riding penalty
inapplicable.
In Levin, the facts did not support the conclusion that the
vehicle was taken temporarily because the car was missing for two
days and the lock cylinder had besen removed so that the vehicle
could be driven without a key.

Levin, 587 P.2d at 126.

Hence, the

defendant had an intent to permanently deprive and the version of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 under which the defendant was convicted in
Levin required that the defendant be in possession of a vehicle he
knew or had reason to believe had been stolen.
By contrast, the only version of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112
applicable to the facts in the instant case is a literal reading of
the version requiring that the defendant be in possession of a
vehicle he knew or had reason to believe was unlawfully taken.
Code Ann. § 41-1-109 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who exercises unauthorized
control over a vehicle, not his own, without the
consent of the owner or lawful custodian and with
intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lciwful
custodian of possession of the vehicle, is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor.
(2) An offense under this section is a third
degree felony if the actor does not return the
vehicle to the owner or lawful custodian within 24
hours after the exercise of unauthorized control.
- 14 -
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such an interpretation precludes the class A misdemeanor joy riding
charge from ever being used since it would be a rare individual who
would take a vehicle, joy ride in it, then take it to the owner's
home, and ring the doorbell or otherwise seek out the owner in order
to return the vehicle.

Instead, a practical reading of the

twenty-four hour requirement is that the vehicle be left in the
vicinity from which it was taken so that the owner can easily
retrieve it.

In practice, joy riding is generally charged where

there was an intent to temporarily deprive; the twenty-four hour
lesser penalty provision is used where a vehicle is not damaged or
altered and returned within twenty-four hours to the place from
which it was taken.
In this case, the vehicle was not altered or damaged,
Defendant intended to leave it near the place from which it was
taken, and it apparently was returned to the owner within
twenty-four hours.

The lesser class A penalty should be applicable

in this case.
The trial court erred in convicting Mr. Basford under Utah
Code Ann. § 41-1-112. Appellant respectfully requests that the
conviction be reversed and the case remanded with an order that he
be convicted of Joy Riding, a class A misdemeanor.
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CONCLUSION
Appellar1" respectful 1 y requests that this Court .reverse his
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tor Joy Riding
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ADDENDUM A

miss owf j*iir csiru
JAMES BRADSHAW, (#3768)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

Third Judicial District

FEB 1 6 1989
S»wT*LA*5:O^Hi fY

**

Deplete*

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

STIPULATION

Plaintiff,
v.
RONALD W. BASFORD

Case No. 881991522
HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON

Defendant.

The defendant, RONALD W. BASFORD, his attorney, JAMES C.
BRADSHAW and the state through, Deputy County Attorney, ERNIE JONES,
do hereby stipulate to the following facts:
1.

That on September 29, 1988 Mr. Ken McAffee parked his

1983 Ford pickup truck on the street in Salt Lake County.
2.

That on September 29, 1988 at approximately 9:00 p.m.

some person took the truck and that no person had permission to take
the vehicle.
3.

That on September 30, 1988 at 1:00 a.m. Officer

H. M. Cutler of the Sandy Police Department observed the defendant,
RONALD W. BASFORD, driving Mr. McAffeefs 1983 Ford pickup in Sandy
Utah.
4.

That Officer Cutler attempted to stop the defendant,

RONALD W. BASFORD, but that the defendant attempted to flee.

5.

That Mr. Basford was eventually stopped and arrested,

6.

That Mr. Basford would testify that on September 30,

1988 he was in possession of Mr. McAffee's car at a time when he
knew that the car had been unlawfully taken and further, that it was
his intent to abandon the vehicle that night near the area from
which it had been taken.
DATED this

day of February, 1989.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

RONALD W. BASFORD
Defendant
^

<:E3ftlE JONES

Deputy Coun/y Attorney

JAifES CT BRADSHAW
:orney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of
the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111 ,

this J£Aday

of February, 1989.

ADDENDUM B

defendant's testimony would be that, in fact, it was his
intent to return the vehicle.
THE COURT:
decision.

I have dictated a memorandum

I did it yesterday afternoon, subject to being

changed if oral argument were to change my mind.

I am

now signing this because my decision remains. And since
I have made a memorandum decision, in civil matters we
always mail these and in criminal matters I know the
defendant must be here, I am going to simply read it so
that we don't have me speaking on the record orally and
something else written in the memorandum decision.
"Defendant Basford has been charged with the
crime of Possession of a Stolen Vehicle a third degree
felony.

Defendant admits that he was in possession of

the victim's vehicle but that the facts dictate that he
should have been charged under Section 41-1-109, Utah
Code Annotated, the joyriding statute.
"The State and the defendant have submitted the
matter to the Court on stipulated facts. The State and
the defendant and defendant's counsel have stipulated in
writing to applicable facts and have stipulated that the
Court decide guilt or innocence based upon the
stipulation and applicable law.

The defendant has waived

his right to trial by jury, and has stipulated to the
said procedure.
9

1

"The stipulation sets forth the following

2

essential facts: No. 1: That the victim's truck was

3

taken by some person without permission on September 29,

4

1988, at about 9:00 p.m.

5

"No. 2:

That the police observed defendant

6

Basford driving the said truck some four hours later on

7

September 30, 1988, at about 1:00 a.m.

8
9
10
11
12

"No. 3:

The police attempted to stop the

defendant; however, the defendant attempted to flee.
"No. 4:

That defendant was eventually

apprehended and arrested.
"No. 5:

That Basford would testify that he

13

knew the vehicle was unlawfully taken and that it was his

14

intent to abandon the vehicle that night near the area

15

from which it had been taken.

16

"For one to be guilty of depriving an owner of

17

a vehicle, that is joyriding, what we commonly call the

18

joyriding statute, he has to have exercised unauthorized

19

control over a vehicle which is not his own, and to have

20

done so with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner

21

of possession.

22

be guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

23

did not return the vehicle to the owner within 24 hours,

24

the crime then becomes a third degree felony.

25

guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle, one has to have

If such be the case such defendant would
Furthermore, if he

To be

been in possession of a vehicle which he knew or had
reason to know had been stolen or unlawfully taken.
"In this case, defendant knew the vehicle had
been taken without authorization and was in possession at
the time with this knowledge and when observing the
police, attempted to flee from the police. At this point
he was subject to Section 41-1-112 Utah Code Annotated.
The actions of the defendant in attempting to flee the
police are not indicative of intent to only temporarily
deprive the owner of his property.
"The defendant claims he intended to abandon
the said vehicle, is not the same as returning the
vehicle to the owner within 24 hours under Section 41-1109 Code Annotated.

That statute requires the actor to

return the vehicle to the owner within 24 hours or suffer
the said crime to be a third degree felony.

Under either

statute the defendant would be guilty of a third degree
felony.
"The Court finds that the acts of the defendant
fall within Section 41-1-112 Utah Code Annotated.

That

the elements of that crime differ from the elements of
the crime in Section 41-1-109. That the facts stipulated
to and the reasonable inferences thereof do not bring
this matter within 41-1-109. The Court therefore, based
upon the facts, find the defendant guilty of the crime of
11

1

possession of a vehicle which he knew or had reason to

2

know had been stolen or unlawfully taken in violation of

3

Section 41-1-112."
And the Court having so found the defendant

4
5

guilty —
MR. BRADSHAW:

6
7

inquiry to the Court in regards to the Court's finding?
THE COURT:

8
9

Your Honor, could I make an

I have read the decision. The

argument has been made. The decision is here. You don't

10

get to ask the jury.

You don't get to question the jury.

11

You put it on stipulated facts and I have made the

12

decision.

Right or wrong, it is made.
MR. BRADSHAW:

13

I certainly accept the Court's

14

decision.

I think there is one point of law that needs

15

to be clarified, and would ask an opportunity since this

16

is a purely legal matter that was submitted to the Court

17

for a legal determination as to that point of law.

18

THE COURT: What is the problem?

19

MR. BRADSHAW:

And that is as to the elements

20

of the statute to which the defendant has been found

21

guilty:

22

Court's ruling, has found —

41-1-112. The Court, as I understand the

THE COURT: Mr. Bradshaw, I have made my

23
24

decision.

It is a memorandum decision and if you want to

25

file a motion, go ahead but then Mr. Jones can respond to
12

1

that-

But I don't want to go any further with it.

2

MR. BRADSHAW:

If I could just be heard

3

briefly.

If this were a jury case, we would be entitled

4

to know what elements were submitted to the jury and what

5

the elements of that offense are. And I think in this

6

case the question revolves around whether the defendant

7

has an intent to permanently deprive or an intent to

8

temporarily deprive.

9

neither of those.

The statute 41-1-112 contains

If I understand the Court's ruling

10

correctly, the Court is not finding that an intent to

11

permanently deprive as an element of this offense?

12

THE COURT:

I am finding that there is no

13

evidence that he intended to return and he doesn't come

14

under that section. The fact that he fled from the

15

police certainly shows no intent to return that to the

16

owner, and the fact that he intended to abandon it, does

17

not meet the requirements of that statute wherein the

18

owner must return the vehicle.

19

is guilty of, I think it is 112, and the elements are set

20

forth in that statute and he is in violation of those

21

elements.

And with that, I will say no more.

22

MR. BRADSHAW:

23

THE COURT:

24

for sentencing on —

25

And I am finding that he

Thank you, Your Honor.

Okay, this matter is already set

MR. BRADSHAW:

April 3rd, Your Honor, at 2:00.
13

i
THE COURT: We will submit this matter, request
2

a Presentence Report and the slip has already been filled

3

out.

4

for April 3rd , 1989, at :2:00 p.m.

5

MR. BRADSHAW:

Let 's just make sure of that date.

Sentence is set

Okay.

Thank you, Your Honor.

6

(End of hearing.)

7

* * * *

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
14

